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This paper considers the effect of acquisition FDI on the knowledge production function. We 
distinguish between acquisitions by MNEs from technologically leading countries and those 
behind the technological frontier. We show  that both acquire similarly R&D intensive 
domestic firms, but there are important differences post-acquisition.  Acquisitions from 
technologically intensive countries reduce domestic R&D effort, in favour of an increase in 
foreign technology transfers, which suggests complementarities in the knowledge assets of the 
MNE and the target firm as a reason for FDI. In contrast, consistent with technology sourcing 
FDI, acquisitions from non-leading countries increase internal R&D efforts. 
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The important role played by technology in explanations of cross-country differences in the level 
of income per capita has led to academic and policy interest in the process of technology creation, its 
location,
1 and the channels for its diffusion. Multinational firms (MNEs) have been central within this 
analysis (Keller, 2010). It is now well established that MNEs are major producers of new technologies 
(Criscuolo  et  al.,  2010,  Dunning  and  Lundan,  2008; Javorcik, 2010),
2 have  become  increasingly 
globalised in the location of their R&D over time (Bloom and Griffith, 2001; NSF, 2011),
3 and are much 
more likely to use knowledge sourced internationally within the R&D production function
4 (Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 2004; Criscuolo et al., 2010). 
In this paper we explore the link between the internationalisation of R&D and the knowledge 
production function by providing, 1) empirical evidence on the knowledge inputs used by R&D active 
domestically owned firms that are targeted for acquisition by foreign MNEs; 2) what happens to these 
input choices post-acquisition; and 3) whether there are differences between MNEs from technologically 
leading countries and by those lagging behind the technological frontier. That the firms we examine are 
all R&D active, and remain so, indicates complementarities in the knowledge assets of the MNE and the 
target firm as a possible motive for FDI (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008). The foreign MNE acquires the 
domestic firm in the expectation that there are economic gains from combining the knowledge assets
held by each party (Dunning, 1981). That suggests that the firms selected for acquisition are likely to 
differ from non-acquired firms, but how? If complementarities are important we might anticipate that 
those firms that  generate most  of  their new knowledge  internally, rather than  buying  in R&D from 
others, will be more likely to be acquired. 
If complementarity in knowledge assets between the MNE and the target firm are indeed an 
important motive for FDI, as well as evidence of a pre-acquisition difference in the knowledge inputs 
used by acquired and non-acquired firms, we might also anticipate finding post-acquisition changes to 
the knowledge production function in the target firm.
5 Moreover, because the acquisitions we study occur 
                                                
1 The location of R&D is of importance if the spillovers from R&D are localised. For evidence supportive of this 
view see Jaffe (1986) and Henderson et al. (1993).
2 According to Javorcik (2010); in 2002, 700 firms, 98% of which are multinational corporations, accounted for 
46% of the world’s total R&D expenditure and 69% of the world’s business R&D.
3 Bloom  and  Griffith  (2001)  provide  detailed  evidence  on  the  internationalisation  of  R&D  amongst  the  G5 
countries. According to the NSF (2011) around 13 per cent of all expenditures on R&D by US MNEs is conducted 
outside of the United States.
4 We  use  the  term  R&D  production  function  interchangeably  with  the  term  knowledge  production  function 
throughout the paper. The term knowledge production function is usually credited to Griliches (1979) and describes 
how new knowledge creation depends on the people and capital applied to discovery and the stock of existing 
knowledge. 
5 Given our focus on the knowledge inputs used by acquired firms in the pre- and post-acquisition periods we 
consider only firms that are R&D active throughout the sample period. In our study of the post-acquisition changes 
that occur we therefore capture the effect the treatment (foreign-acquisition) on the treated.2
in a country (Spain)
6 that would not typically be viewed as on the technological frontier, we might expect
that  these  post-acquisition  changes  will  differ across  MNEs. For  instance,  MNEs  from  more 
technologically advanced countries can be expected to have superior stocks of internal knowledge. The 
extent of any ex-post transfers of technology by these MNEs might therefore be greater compared to 
those MNEs from countries that are less technologically intensive. The knowledge production function 
of  the  affiliate  will  be  altered  to  be  more  reliant  on  within-MNE  knowledge when  FDI  is  from 
technologically intensive countries. The intellectual property (IP) reforms that took place in Spain just 
prior to the time period of study (2004-2009) provide further support for this view.
7 Branstetter et al. 
(2006) show in a cross-country panel setting that periods of IP reform stimulated increased transfer of 
technology  from  US  multinationals  to  their  affiliates,  along  with  increased  R&D  expenditures  and 
patenting. They also find  that these effects were  strongest  for  firms with  the most to gain from IP 
reforms, as measured by their pre-reform US patenting behaviour, and that they are not mirrored for 
domestic firms. 
For the majority of the acquisitions that occur in our data, technology levels in the country of 
origin of the MNE are relatively similar or lower than in Spain. For acquisitions by MNEs from these 
countries it is less obvious that complementary knowledge assets between the acquirer and the target are 
the  motive  for  FDI,  and  as  a  consequence  the  expected post-acquisition  changes  in  the  knowledge 
production function are harder to predict. For example, for MNEs from countries further behind the 
technical frontier, FDI is more likely to contain technology sourcing motives (van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie and Lichtenberg, 2001; and Griffith et al., 2006). But, does that imply there will be a greater 
relative expansion of internal R&D capabilities post acquisition, or will the MNE try to tap-into the R&D 
efforts of local firms by outsourcing R&D within Spain? Will there also be evidence of knowledge 
transfers from the parent firm, or alternatively, does it affect the type of firms that are acquired? 
By studying the role of knowledge complementarities as both a determinant and outcome from 
acquisition FDI we contribute to three separate strands of the literature on the R&D behaviour of MNEs. 
Harris and Robinson (2002), Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006), Chen (2011), Balsvik and Haller (2010) 
and Guadalupe et al. (2010) have previously shown that foreign MNEs are more likely to select domestic 
firms that are more productive, larger and more likely to conduct R&D. We build on that analysis to 
include the knowledge inputs used by firms. There also exists from Veugelers and Cassiman (2004), 
Criscuolo  et  al.  (2010)  and  Wagner  (2006)  cross-sectional  evidence  of  differences  in  the  type  of 
knowledge inputs used by MNEs and non-MNEs. Here, as well as describing the changes that occur to 
                                                
6According  to  the  European  Commission  Spain  is  considered  a  moderately  innovative  country (European 
Innovation Scoreboard, 2009). Similarly, using OECD data on the ratio of business enterprise R&D expenditures 
over GDP, Spain ranks 20
th out of 27 countries (including Spain) in our sample.
7 We use the reform period as a motivation and do not provide a test of whether IP reform stimulated the observed 
FDI inflows. We do so because the reforms do not offer the opportunity to apply a clear treatment versus control 
approach:  they were contained in a number of pieces of legislation, involved the establishment of courts with 
different remits to look at IP issues and were spread across a number of years. 3
the choice of knowledge inputs in newly acquired firms we provide new evidence of differences in the 
knowledge production function between MNEs from different countries.
8
Finally, we also build on the literature that has considered the effects of foreign acquisition on 
various aspects of firm performance. Here Harris and Robinson (2002), Girma et al. (2007) and Chen 
(2011) have all found that productivity in the target firm improves post-acquisition, while Conyon et al. 
(2002) and Girma and Görg (2007) have demonstrated a similar impact on employment and wages. In 
their recent review of the empirical literature Stiebale and Reize (2011) conclude that the effects of 
foreign acquisition on total R&D expenditure, or R&D intensity, of the target firms are more mixed. As 
an  example,  Bandick et  al.  (2010)  and Bertrand (2009)  find  that R&D expenditures rose following 
foreign acquisition, while Stiebale and Reize (2011) report they fell. More recently Guadalupe et al. 
(2010) have shown that the type of innovation (product or process) as well as other firm investments, 
including efforts to assimilate foreign technologies and purchases of new machinery and organisation 
practices, change in the post-acquisition period. Our evidence contributes to this literature by offering a 
more disaggregated study of the effects of acquisition FDI on R&D and in so doing sheds some light 
onto why the post-acquisition improvement in productivity in the target firm might occur. As Veugelers 
and Cassiman (2004) write, without direct evidence on technology transfer such as offered in this paper, 
it  becomes  difficult  to  evaluate  what  sorts  of  FDI  have  positive  economic  effects  and  which  have 
negative effects.
In combining these questions we view though, the main contribution of the paper to be the 
empirical insights it provides for theoretical models that emphasise complementarities as a motive for 
acquisition FDI, such as that by Nocke and Yeaple (2008).
9 As those authors emphasise, acquisition FDI 
is  the  dominant  form of  FDI (Barba Navaretti  and  Venables,  2004) and  is often  assumed to  occur 
because it allows firms to exploit complementarities in their assets. Yet, they cite no direct empirical 
evidence to support the role of complementarities in acquisition FDI. In this paper we use evidence on 
the pre-acquisition knowledge production function of the acquired firms along with any changes that 
occur and post-acquisition to infer whether knowledge assets were an important determinant of FDI.
The data we exploit is an annualised version of the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
which covers 4,295 innovating firms over the period from 2004 to 2009. This dataset provides detailed 
information on the R&D behaviour of firms, distinguishing knowledge inputs by provider and between 
national and international origins, alongside information on the ownership structure of the firm in an 
annual panel setting. The methodology we apply is that used to investigate other effects of acquisition-
                                                
8 A second difference with this paper is that where they explore the relationship between knowledge inputs and 
knowledge outputs (such as patents) we explore how the inputs change across time. The information on inputs also 
differs however.  In the UK version of the CIS there is qualitative information on the ‘use’ and ‘importance’ of a 
particular source of knowledge input. Here we use data on expenditures.
9 Guadalupe et al. (2010) provide evidence on a different complementarity; that between innovation and market 
scale.4
FDI on  target  firm  performance by Chen  (2011), Girma  and Görg (2007), Girma et  al.  (2007) and
Guadalupe et al. (2010). In order to control for the selection effects on the firms chosen for acquisition 
we combine propensity score matching with difference-in-differences.  
To preview our findings, we find from our analysis strong evidence of cherry-picking of the best 
domestic firms for acquisition. Even though all of the firms we examine are R&D active, acquired firms 
are typically larger and more productive than non-acquired firms. They also differ in their R&D inputs 
prior  to  acquisition compared to  non-acquired  firms. Here  we  find  the  probability  of  acquisition  is 
increasing  in  the  level  of  internal  R&D  expenditures  and  decreasing  in  external  expenditures.  As 
expected, firms with greater internally generated knowledge are indeed more attractive to foreign MNEs
than those that rely more extensively on external sources of knowledge inputs. Foreign MNEs are also 
found to more likely target firms that are already internationalised in their R&D in that they have R&D 
facilities  located  abroad.  We  find  there  are  no  significant  differences  though,  in  the  knowledge 
characteristics of firms acquired by MNEs that are from the most technologically intensive countries 
versus those that are not. We also find no role for the new patents that Spanish firms have generated. The 
domestically owned firms targeted for acquisition are statistically different from non-acquired Spanish 
owned firms in their choice of knowledge inputs, but not outputs, and not from each other. We interpret 
this  as  evidence  consistent  with  the  view  that  the  knowledge  assets  held  by  the  acquired were  an 
important motive behind the acquisition. 
We also find an effect of the internationalisation of R&D on the knowledge production function
post-acquisition. From our results we find that the effects of acquisition FDI can be characterised as 
belonging  to  one  of  three  types.  FDI  inflows from  the  most  technologically  intensive  countries 
(Germany, Japan and the US) leads to a shift away from local (within Spain) effort in the production of 
R&D, in favour of an increase in knowledge drawn from foreign external sources. These effects are 
particularly strong for those knowledge flows from within foreign parts of the same business group. We 
conclude from this that acquisition FDI from technology intensive countries are associated with greater 
technology transfers between affiliates and that this was the complementary knowledge asset held by the 
foreign MNE. 
In comparison, when FDI inflows are from countries that have a similar technological intensity
than Spain, there are no significant changes in the knowledge production function of the newly acquired 
firm. For this group there is evidence of the selection of the best domestic firms for acquisition, but there 
are no significant changes to the knowledge production function post-acquisition. It is therefore not clear 
from this evidence what role the knowledge assets of the foreign MNE played in the decision to acquire 
the Spanish owned firm. Finally, when acquisition FDI is from countries that are less technologically 
intensive  than  Spain, we  find  evidence  consistent  with  technology  sourcing  FDI rather  than 
complementary knowledge assets as the motive for FDI. Relative to a matched control group on non-
acquired firms, and even though we have only a small number of acquisitions within this group, we find 5
significant evidence that total innovation expenditures of the affiliate rise post-acquisition and there is a 
change in the input mix now towards domestic internal R&D effort. We are not aware of any similar 
studies that provide evidence that international technology transfers occur alongside technology sourcing 
FDI within the same country.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  literatures  relating  to 
multinational firms, acquisition FDI and R&D. Section 3 details the data that we use, while in sections 4 
and 5 describes our empirical results. Section 4 considers which firms are selected for acquisition and 
Section 5 the changes to the knowledge production function. Finally, we draw some conclusions from the 
study in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
That  MNEs  are  different  from  non-MNEs  is  a  well-established  empirical  result found  to 
encompass  a  wide  range  of  performance  measures including  size  (output  and  sales),  human  capital 
intensity, productivity and R&D (see for example the review in Greenaway and Kneller, 2007 or Keller, 
2010). These differences are often interpreted as reflecting the superior technology of MNEs (Markusen, 
2004), which in turn has been used as motivation to suggest MNEs will also differ in the volume and 
type of inputs they use to create new knowledge. In their study of the knowledge production function
Criscuolo  et  al.  (2010) generate  three  key  findings.  Firstly,  they  find  that  MNEs  generate  more 
knowledge outputs than firms that sell just to the domestic market or export. In part, this is explained by 
the volume of inputs these firms use. Globally engaged firms have greater expenditures on R&D and 
more  scientists  and  engineers  dedicated  to  this  task.  But, they  also  find  the  knowledge  production 
function of these firms differs in other ways, in particular the number of knowledge sources used. MNEs,
they claim, learn more from links with their customers and suppliers and from intra-firm worldwide pool 
of information. This supports evidence from Veugelers and Cassiman (2004) who find that subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals located in Belgium are more likely to acquire technology internationally. 
Given  the  importance  of  M&A  in  total  FDI  flows,  an  important  question  is  whether  these 
differences in the knowledge production function reflect pre- or post-acquisition differences. That is 
whether there is selection of the best domestic firms by acquisition by foreign MNEs, and if not, when 
the changes in inputs occurs. On this question the literature has focused on the volume and intensity of 
R&D, while indirect evidence also exists from those studies that have looked for the effects of cross-
border M&A on productivity. These studies are of additional interest given that most apply matching and 
differences-in-differences as an empirical methodology, and therefore also study the selection of firms 
for acquisition. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests cherry-picking of the best domestic firms. The 6
probability of acquisition is found to be increasing in firm size, productivity, human capital intensity and 
R&D.
10
In their recent review of the available empirical evidence Stiebale and Reize (2011) find that 
most studies find a negative relationship between M&A and subsequent R&D, although they note that 
some of this general negative outcome might be explained by the fact most studies do not differentiate 
acquisitions that are by foreign or domestic firms, and because they usually focus on the R&D activity of 
the entire economy (Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006) or the acquiring company (Marin and Alvarez, 2009). 
There  are  comparatively  few  studies  that  assess the  causal  effect  of  foreign  acquisitions  on  the 
subsequent restructuring process of R&D activities in the target firm. One of the exceptions is that by
Bandick  et  al.  (2010),  who study  the  effect  of  foreign  acquisition  on  Swedish  target  firms using a 
propensity score matching approach. Their results suggest that the fear of foreign takeovers resulting in a 
relocation of R&D to the MNE country of origin is unjustified. They find that cross border acquisitions 
entail increased R&D intensity in the Swedish targets. As similar conclusions is reached by Bertrand 
(2009).  He  looks  at  cross-border  M&A  in  France  from  1994-2004  and  finds  positive  effects  of 
international acquisitions on the level of R&D spending as well as sub-components such as internal and 
external R&D, along with measures of the type of research (basic, applied and development). In contrast, 
Stiebale and Reize (2011) find negative effects of cross border M&A on innovation activities of target 
firms in Germany, both when measured as the level of expenditure and the propensity to conduct R&D. 
Finally, the possibility that differences in the motives for FDI might impact on firm performance 
has been a relatively little studied, with closest work being that of Griffith at al. (2006) and Chen (2011). 
In contrast to the work conducted here Griffith at al. (2006) evaluate how the performance of the target 
firm affects the investor’s productivity. They show that growth of the US R&D stock had a stronger 
productivity impact on UK firms that had more of their inventors located in the US. They interpret this as 
evidence that these UK firms uses their US R&D facilities to benefit from the general growth in the stock 
of US, where this effect is stronger for industries for which UK technology lies further behind that in the 
US. It is also asymmetric in the sense that US firms do not benefit from the growth in the UK stock of 
R&D in the same way. 
In studying the performance of the target firm, the recent work of Chen (2011) displays perhaps 
the most similar motivation to the work conducted in this paper, although there the distinction is between 
FDI from developed and developing countries. He finds that firms acquired by MNE from industrialized 
countries  exhibit  the  greatest  improvement  in  post-acquisition  performance.  Acquisitions  from 
developing countries entailed lower labour productivity gains as compared to targets that were acquired 
by domestic firms. 
                                                
10 See Blonigen and  Taylor (2000) for evidence on the R&D intensity  of the acquiring firm.  They uncover a 
significant negative relationship between acquisition and R&D intensity, which they suggest may reflect the growth 
strategy of the acquiring firm. Firms choose between an internal growth strategy with high R&D intensity versus an 
external growth strategy with acquisitions.7
3. Data 
The  data  we  use  come  from  a  yearly  survey of  Spanish  firms  called  Panel  de  Innovación 
Tecnológica (PITEC). This survey has been conducted since 2004 by the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics as an annualised version of the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (EUROSTAT). We use 
information  for  every  year  between 2004  and 2009.  The  survey is  designed  to  be a  representative, 
unbalanced panel sample of firms operating in the manufacturing and service sectors.
11 Each year firms
are asked to provide information on a number of key performance characteristics, such as sales, number 
of  employees,  ownership and  industry  and, of  interest  in  this  paper,  detailed  answers about  their
innovation activities.
Given our interest in the inputs used in the knowledge production function we exclude from the 
sample those firms without continuous total innovation expenditures. We also exclude public firms, firms 
that  are  always  foreign  owned,  firms  that  were  acquired  more  than  once,  firms  that  exited  either 
permanently or temporarily from the sample and
12 to control for possible outliers firms with turnover 
above or below the 1% and 99% tails of the distribution. Our chosen sample is an unbalanced panel of 
4,295 innovating firms.
We study firm’s innovation expenditures at different levels of aggregation (these are shown in
Table 1 and Table A1 in the Appendix). The most aggregated measure is total innovation expenditures.
This includes three categories of spending: internal R&D (R&D undertaken within the plant); spending 
on external R&D (a firm’s purchases of R&D conducted by other firms); and non-R&D expenditures 
(which  includes  expenditures  on training,  market  preparations  of  products  or  market  research  and 
advertising).
13 These three categories account for 73%, 11% and 16% of total innovation expenditures 
respectively for the average firm in our sample.  Firms also report figures on external R&D broken down 
into those that are domestic purchases or imports. We label these variables external-domestic R&D, and 
external-foreign R&D, respectively. For the average firm, external domestic accounts for the majority of 
total external R&D expenditures (93% on average).
Finally, the survey also provides information on R&D spending by type of provider. With this 
information, we can further classify external-foreign R&D into the following groups: i) external-foreign 
R&D within the same business group, which includes imports from the headquarter  and from other 
                                                
11 The panel is unbalanced with 12,873 firms generating a total of 76,902 firm-year observations with an average of 
five observations per firm. It is a legal requirement for firms to respond to this survey.
12 We exclude firms that exit because disturbances around the time of closure affect a firm’s economic variables, 
which we cannot disentangle from acquisition effects. 
13 External  R&D expenditures  are  defined  as:  “Acquisitions  of  R&D  services  through  contracts,  informal 
agreements,  etc. Funds  to  finance  other  companies,  research  associations,  etc,  which  do  not  directly  imply 
purchases of R&D services are excluded”. R&D services are defined as: “Creative work to increase the volume of 
knowledge and to create new or improved products and processes (including the development of software)”. The 
exact definitions of all other innovation variables are documented in the Table A1 in the Appendix.8
affiliates within the same business group, ii) external-foreign R&D from other private firms, namely 
imports from foreign private providers (outside of the same business group), and (iii) external-foreign 
R&D  from  foreign  non-private  providers,  such as  Universities,  public  administration,  non-profit 
organisations (NPO) and other international organizations. These three categories account for 12%, 69% 
and  19%  of  expenditures  on  external  foreign  R&D respectively,  or  just  1%, 6%  and  1.5%  of  total 
innovation expenditures in the average firm. Similar to Branstetter et al. (2006) we use imports of R&D 
from the same business group as an indicator of direct technological flows within the MNE.
14 We report 
evidence on all categories of expenditure except non-R&D expenditures and expenditures on external-
foreign private and non-private R&D. Evidence on these can be found in the Appendix.
The data also contain information on the ownership of the firm, and specifically the location of 
the  headquarters  of  the  owner.  Following  Balsvik  and  Haller  (2010),  Bandick  et  al.  (2010), and 
Guadalupe et al. (2010) among others, we identify foreign acquisition in the sample when we observe a 
change in the majority equity holder of the firm changes (i.e. who controls more than 50% of the equity) 
and the country location of the owner changes from Spanish to some other country.
15 In the data we 
identify 189 acquisitions of R&D active firms by foreign multinationals during the period 2004-2009. As 
described in the introduction we are interested in differences across MNEs, in particular whether they are 
headquartered  in  technologically  intensive  countries  or  not.  We initially  adopt  a  conservative 
classification  of  countries  as  technologically  intensive  or  not  and  include  only  MNEs  from  Japan, 
Germany and USA in this group (see Acemoglu, 2009 or Griffith et al., 2004).
16 We label these as JUG 
countries and  remaining  countries  as  non-JUG. In  Table  2 column  (i),  we  show  the  number  of 
acquisitions by country before the matching procedure that we will implement in the following sections. 
There  are  67 acquisitions  from  JUG  countries and 122  from  non-JUG  countries,  mostly  from  the 
European Union.
In section 5.2 of the paper we test the robustness of our findings to various categorisations of 
countries as technology intensive or not. We use three alternative classifications. In column (iii) of Table 
2, we report the average business enterprise R&D expenditures (BERD) as percentage of GDP using 
OECD data for the period 2004-2009. We use this data to identify the 10 most technologically intensive 
countries in the data (see column v) and the 5 least (see column vii). For the final classification we use 
                                                
14 Branstetter et al. (2006) consider royalty payments for the use or sale of intangible assets made by affiliates to 
parent firms.
15 This measure is consistent with the IMF (2009) definition of who has ultimate control of the acquired firm and is 
attractive for the purposes of this paper in that it allows us to assign a unique country of origin to the new affiliate.
There are small number of acquisitions for which the foreign equity share moves to majority ownership but the 
headquarters is registered as being within Spain. Given our interest in the origin country we drop these firms from 
the analysis.
16 The dataset contains information on the industry in which the acquired firm operates in but does not contain the 
same information for acquiring MNE. For this reason we chose against classifying industry-country combinations 
as on, or behind, the technical frontier.9
the list of countries defined by the European Commission as technologically intensive (listed in column 
vi).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firms that have been acquired, differentiating between 
acquisition from JUG and non-JUG countries, and for domestic firms that have never been acquired. For 
acquired firms, we show values for the year in which the acquisition takes place, along with that for the 
year before and the year after the acquisition. A fall in the number of observations occurs for the year 
after acquisition because of the effect of the end of the sample period on those acquired in 2008. To 
mitigate the effects of sample composition we display limited information on the level of expenditure 
and instead report percentages of various totals.
A comparison between acquired and non-acquired firms reveals some interesting differences. 
Firstly, firms that are targeted for acquisition spend more on innovation, around 2.5 times more. This 
would seem to indicate that the largest R&D firms are selected for acquisition and therefore help to 
explain why Criscuolo et al. (2010) found MNEs had more R&D inputs than non-MNEs. Secondly, 
acquired and non-acquired firms actually spend a similar proportion of total innovation expenditures on 
internal versus external R&D effort. In the period before acquisition the percentage share of internal 
(external) R&D in total innovation expenditure was 74% (13%) for acquired firms, compared to 73% 
(11%) in non-acquired firms. The table also reveals there are strong similarities in these percentages 
when we separate acquisitions into those by MNEs from JUG and non-JUG countries. It would seem 
from the evidence so far that acquired firms spend more on internal and external R&D than non-acquired 
firms in total, but in similar proportions. 
The differences between acquired and non-acquired firms reveal themselves primarily in the 
share of total external R&D spent on domestic (foreign) R&D effort, with now also some difference 
between firms acquired by MNEs from JUG and non-JUG countries. The numbers in the table suggest 
that non-acquired firms spend 94% of total external R&D expenditures on purchases from other Spanish 
firms.  For  acquired firms  the  comparable  figures  are  (in  the  pre-acquisition  period)  59%  when 
acquisitions are from JUG countries and 77% when from non-JUG countries. Acquired firms are, it 
seems, on average more intensive in their use of external-foreign R&D. The final three columns of the 
table  suggest  that  this  is  almost  exclusively  explained  by  their  use  of  knowledge  purchased  from 
elsewhere in the firm. Expenditures of this type account for about 2% of total R&D expenditures for 
acquired firms and 0.03% for non-acquired firms. As we describe below this variable indicates that the 
acquired firm is domestic (Spanish) multinational firm, at least in its R&D effort.
A comparison of the trends from pre- to post-acquisition between firms acquired from JUG and 
non-JUG countries suggests a few obvious patterns in Table 1. Total innovation expenditures display 
little trend in either case, but there is an indication that the percentage spent on internal R&D falls in the 
JUG group of MNEs over time, whereas there is a rise for the non-JUG group. Of the components of 
external-foreign  R&D  there  is  also  a  clear  difference  in  expenditures  on  technology  transfers  from 10
elsewhere in the business group. These display a much stronger rise when acquisition is from the JUG 
countries compared to the non-JUG group.
4. Characteristics of Acquired Firms
In this section, we examine the characteristics of firms that are acquired by foreign multinational 
firms with non-acquired firms, conditional on the restriction that the firms had non-zero internal R&D 
expenditures in period t-1.
17 For this task we estimate a probit model in which we regress a dummy 
variable indicator of whether the firm becomes acquired during the sample period on various innovation 
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In equation (1),  it Acquisition is a dummy variable that takes the value one if there is a change 
from domestic to foreign ownership. The vector  1 it X  reflects pre-treatment firm characteristics that 
influence  acquisition,
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t d denotes  time  dummies,  and  it  is  the  error  term,  which  we  assume  is 
normally distributed with variance 
2
  . In all regressions we use cluster robust standard errors.
We use the results in Table 3 to test whether any of the R&D variables, the level of innovation
expenditures or their intensity and the mix of expenditures on internal and external R&D, help to identify 
firms that were more likely to be acquired. Building on the evidence from the summary statistics in Table 
1, in column (i) we include the (log of) total innovation expenditures and a measure of the innovation 
intensity of the firm. The evidence in Table 1 displayed clear evidence that acquired firms had greater
total expenditures on innovation. 
In column (ii) we include the ratio of external to internal R&D and two measures of expenditures 
on external foreign R&D within the same business group. For these variables the summary statistics 
suggested that acquired firms spent a similar proportion of total expenditures on internal and external 
R&D to non-acquired firms, whereas R&D transfers from overseas R&D facilities (external  foreign 
R&D within the group) were noticeably higher. We include two measures of this type of expenditures 
because, while the dataset includes detailed information on the international structure of a firms’ R&D, it 
does not include the same information  on its  production structure. Put  differently, we do not know 
whether the acquired firm is a MNE in its production or not, only whether it is an MNE in its R&D or 
                                                
17 We include this restriction to avoid some outliers, which did not have internal R&D before being acquired.
18 We use a pooled cross-sectional approach. The results also hold if we use a random effect probit model.
19 These variables should not be affected by the treatment otherwise the conditional independence assumption is 
violated. This is accommodated by using pre-treatment or lagged values of the variables X (Imbens, 2004).11
not. To capture possible differences we include in the regression a dummy variable equal to one if the 
plant had overseas R&D facilities alongside the level of these expenditures (external same business 
group dummy). We assume here that the dummy variable will capture whether being a MNE (in R&D 
and/or possibly production) matters or not for acquisition, so that the intensity variable reflects more 
clearly the effects of the type of knowledge input the firm uses. Finally, in column (iii) we replace the 
measures of total innovation expenditures with those on (the log of) external and internal R&D, whilst 
retaining the external foreign R&D variables. 
Following evidence from Chen (2011) and others we also include in all regressions a set of other 
non-R&D variables including measures of firm size (employees), labour productivity (measured as sales 
over employees) and an indicator for whether the firm exports or not. In order to test for possible non-
linearities in  the  effects of  employment  we  create a  set of  size bands  equal to  one  if  the firm  has 
employment of <50, 50-99, 100-199, 200-499 or 500+. We choose the size band 100-199 as the omitted 
category such that all marginal effects are calculated relative to that group. We also include a set of 
regional dummies.
From the non-R&D characteristics we find evidence of selection of the best firms for acquisition. 
From column (i) in Table 3, we find that even amongst the set of Spanish firms that conduct R&D the 
probability of acquisition by a foreign MNE is increasing in the labour productivity of the firm and is 
also positively correlated with the firms’ export status. The effect of size on the probability of acquisition
is non-linear. Compared to firms with average employment levels (employment between 100-199), those 
that are smaller are significantly less likely to be acquired. The estimates marginal effects reported in the 
table suggest that for the smallest firms (emp <50) this probability is 0.78% lower, while for firms with 
employment between 50 and 99 it is 0.26% lower. These effects are small because the probability of 
being acquired is low in the data, around 4%. For large firms we find no relationship with the probability 
of foreign acquisition however. Firms with more than 200 employees are not significantly more likely to 
be acquired than firms with between 100 and 199 employees. 
In regression (i)  we  find that  in addition to being  more productive and larger, domestically 
owned firms are more likely to be acquired if they have greater innovation expenditures, although its 
innovation intensity has no effect. The marginal effects reported in the table suggest that the effect of 
total innovation spending is around half that estimated for labour productivity. 
In column (ii) we find evidence that the relationship between total innovation spending and 
acquisition is explained by the multinational R&D status of the firm. This dummy variable, set equal to 
one  if  the  firm  has  positive  expenditures  on  innovation  from  other  overseas  affiliates  (and  is  zero 
otherwise), is strongly significant in this regression, whereas the level of innovation expenditures ceases 
to be.
20 The marginal effects suggest that this variable has a sizeable effect on the probability of being 
                                                
20 The export status of the firm is similarly affected and no longer helps to predict the probability of acquisition.12
acquired. Firms with R&D facilities abroad are 3.6% more likely to be acquired, close to the rate of 
acquisition we observe in the data. The measure of the intensity of these expenditures measured relative 
to  total  R&D  is  not  statistically  significant  in  contrast.
21 This  result  might  indicate  that  foreign 
multinationals view the knowledge assets of Spanish owned MNEs to be superior to those of non-MNEs, 
or perhaps more likely given the insignificance of the R&D intensity variables, that foreign-MNEs view 
Spanish MNEs as more attractive targets for acquisition than non-MNEs. 
In regression (ii) of Table 3 we also find no effect on the probability of acquisition from the ratio 
of external/internal R&D intensity, a result consistent with the summary statistics in Table 1. However, 
when we replace this intensity with variables the measure the (logged) level of internal and external 
R&D  expenditures  (columns  iii  and  iv) we  find  a  significant,  and  oppositely  signed,  effect  on  the 
probability of being acquired. The fact that firms that have greater expenditures on external knowledge 
are less likely to be acquired, whereas those with higher internal R&D expenditures are more likely, is 
consistent  with  the  view  that  foreign  MNEs  value  highly  the  internally  generated  aspects  of  new 
knowledge.
22
In  the  remaining  regressions  in  Table  3 we  explore  whether  there  are  differences  between 
acquisitions made by MNEs from Germany, Japan and the US and those made by MNEs from other 
countries. In these regressions we choose to drop the variable measuring external foreign R&D from 
within  the  same  business  group,  using the  results  in  regression  (iv)  as  the  relevant  comparison  for 
acquisitions from all countries pooled together. The results presented in column (v) refer to a regression
where we drop from the regression acquisitions not made by MNEs from Germany, Japan and the US
from the sample, and column (vi) we exclude acquisitions by MNEs from those three countries. 
There are some noticeable differences between the results in these two columns. In column (v) of 
Table 3 we find that compared to non-acquired firms, the level of internal R&D no longer significantly 
affects the probability of acquisition, whereas in column (vi) it does. We also find that the estimated 
marginal effect on the dummy indicating expenditures on R&D from other subsidiaries abroad is larger 
in column (vi) compared to when we use acquisitions from Germany, Japan and the US only (column v). 
This would seem to suggest that it is those MNEs that are from less technologically intensive countries 
that value most the knowledge generated internally to the firm and this potential complementarity with 
the  knowledge  of  the  MNE  might  provide  a  motive  for  acquisition.  However,  when  we  test  for 
differences between the firms that are acquired by MNEs from Germany, Japan and the US compared to 
MNEs  from  other  countries  in  column  (vii)  we  find  that  none  of  these  differences  are  statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
                                                
21 If we drop the dummy variable measuring the MNE status of a firms’ R&D the intensity variable is statistically 
significant. 
22 A  result not  reported  here  is  that  we  checked  by  further  differentiating  external  R&D  expenditures  into 
subgroups. We found that this negative effect is attributable to external domestic R&D expenditures.  13
Thus far we have assumed that the complementary knowledge assets targeted by foreign MNEs 
is  revealed  by the  flow  of  expenditures  used  in  the  creation  of  new  knowledge.  The  knowledge 
production is also dependent on the stock of knowledge (Griliches, 1979) and it remains possible that it 
is  this  stock  of  existing  knowledge  that  foreign  MNEs  target.  The  PITEC  survey  does  not  ask  for 
complete information on the stock of assets held by the firm, but it does ask for the number of new 
patents granted over the previous three year period. We add this measure of the (log) number of new 
patents  granted  to  the  firm  to  the  regression  in  Table  4.  There  is  a  small  drop  in  the  number  of 
observations in the regressions as there are some firms that were not granted any patents.
In all of the specifications in Table 4 we find no role for the number of patents on the probability 
of  being acquired  by a foreign  MNE. This  might  reflect  the weakness  of  the  measure used, that it 
measures  only new  patents over  a 3-year  window.  It  might  alternatively  reflect  a  view that  not  all
Spanish R&D is at or close to the technological frontier and is therefore not a consistent factor used by 
foreign  MNEs  when  choosing  acquisition  targets  in  Spain.  Whichever  view  holds,  the  results  for 
innovation expenditures we found in Table 3 are unaffected by the inclusion of the patent variable.
We conclude from this exercise that firms’ acquired by foreign MNEs are significantly different 
from  non-acquired  firms  in  Spain,  with  strong  evidence  of  cherry-picking.  In  addition  to  firm 
characteristics  such  as  size  and  productivity  this  selection  is  also  determined  by  differences  in  the 
knowledge production function, but not by any recent patents the firm has acquired. Complementarity 
appears to be in the location of R&D and the mix of inputs used. Foreign owned firms target firms that 
have greater internal R&D expenditures or are multinational in their R&D (and possibly other functions).
While we find some suggestive evidence that there may also be difference in the type of firms acquired 
by MNEs from different origin countries, these differences are not statistically significant. 
5. The Effects of Foreign Acquisitions on Different Measures of Innovation Expenditures
The  fundamental  evaluation  problem  in  finding  the  effects  of  foreign  acquisition  on  the 
innovative  input  structure  of  Spanish  firms  is  that  we  would  like  to  compare  the  after  acquisition 
innovation expenditures of an acquired firm with the firm’s expenditures had it been not acquired. Since 
no firm can be subject to acquisition and not at the same time, this direct comparison is not possible. To 
overcome this, we apply a calliper propensity score matching procedure as an evaluation method. The 
basic idea is to find in the group of non-treated those firms that are most similar to the treated in all 
relevant characteristics before acquisition. Given that finding a match for a treated unit is difficult when 
controlling for more than a few variables, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest to control by a function 
of the vector X instead, which is the conditional  probability of receiving treatment given the set of 14
characteristics.
23 We calculate the propensity score on the basis of the probit model for the full sample, 
reported in column (iv) of Table 3.We pair each acquired firm with the closest non-acquired firm in the 
same industry and year by calliper matching with replacement.
24  The identifying assumption is therefore 
that conditional on observable firm, time and region effects that affect selection, acquisition is random. 
The results therefore describe the effects of acquisition FDI on the knowledge production function.
To validate the quality of the matching procedure, we test whether after matching pre-acquisition 
variables are balanced between acquired and non-acquired firms. The results of our balancing tests are 
displayed in Table 5 in part (a) and (b). After matching, our final sample consists of 295 firms with 154 
acquisitions and 141 untreated firms. There are 55 acquisitions from frontier (Japan, USA and Germany, 
i.e., JUG countries) and 99 acquisitions from non-frontier countries (see Table 2, column ii).
Standardised  biases  are  appropriate  when  looking  at  each  ex  ante  covariate  separately  and 
overall.
25 From this table, we find that, for all of the firm characteristics individually, and together, there 
is a successful reduction in these biases after matching. For all covariates the t-tests indicate that after 
matching the equality of means cannot be rejected, i.e. no significant differences between the acquired 
and non-acquired can be found. For completeness we also report the median standardised bias and its 
reduction due to matching as well as the likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all regressors. 
The latter checks the overall covariate imbalance, as it is also the case for a comparison of the Pseudo-R
2
of the initial probit estimation with the Pseudo-R
2 of the identical estimation on the matched sample of 
treated and controls. We conclude that the treatment and the control group are balanced.
5.1. The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on the Different Measures of Innovation Expenditures
Having  established  the  sample  of  matched  acquired  and  non-acquired  firms,  we  use  the 
following model to estimate the effect of foreign acquisition  on R&D inputs:
'
1 , it it it it i t it Y Acquisition Acquisition Z d                (2)
where  it Y are different measures of innovative expenditures. We include in the regression a set 
of firm-fixed effects, i, such that Equation (2) can be interpreted as a difference-in-differences estimator, 
examining whether acquired firms deviate in their innovative behaviour compared to that in the pre-
acquisition period and compared to the non-treated group. A positive sign on the coefficients  and  
                                                
23 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if conditioning on X makes the non-participation outcome independent 
of the treatment status it is also independent when conditioning on P(X).
24 Our calliper is 0.001. A presentation of alternative matching possibilities is given in Caliendo and Kopeinig
(2008) as well as in Sianesi (2004). Matching is carried out with STATA command PSMATCH2 by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003).
25 The criterion for judging the standardised bias as too large is varying with different studies. While Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1985) and Bertrand (2009) report everything in excess to 20% as too large, Caliendo and Kopeinig 
(2008) demand 3-5% as maximum. For the definition of the standardised bias see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985).15
implies  that  in  the  year  of  the  acquisition  and  one  year  after  acquisition  respectively,  the  plant  is 
spending more than its pre-acquisition level as compared with the changes that occurred in the non-
treated group. Owing to limits on the time series dimension of the panel available to us, we study post-
acquisition effects for just two years. The vector  it Z is a set of control variables,  t d are time dummies, 
and  it  is  the  error  term.  The  regressions  are  estimated  using  robust  variance-covariance  matrix 
estimators clustering at the country level.
Our measures of firm level innovation are those previously described and reported in Table 1 and 
include total innovation expenditures, as well as expenditures on internal and external R&D. We also 
report results for various components of external R&D, where this includes those from other domestic 
firms (external domestic R&D) and imported knowledge (external foreign R&D). Finally we break down 
external foreign R&D further into knowledge imported from other affiliates within the same business 
group (labelled R&D external foreign within the same business group). For completeness we report 
results for the remaining sub-component of total R&D expenditure (non-R&D expenditures) and the 
remaining components of external foreign R&D (external foreign non-private R&D) and that from other 
private  firms  (R&D  external  foreign  from  other  private) in  Table  A2  in  the  Appendix.  As  control 
variables we include firm size, measured by a set of non-overlapping dummies indicating the number of 
employees, and a dummy if the firm exports or not. In including these variables within the regression we 
attempt to control for other firm characteristics that may also change following acquisition by a foreign 
MNE and which may also affect the level of innovative expenditures.
In an extension to Equation (2) we allow the effects of acquisition to differ according to whether 
the  acquiring  firm  is  from  a  technologically  intensive  country  or  not.  In  comparing  the  effects  of 
acquisition by MNEs from different countries we also consider the possibility that there may be other 
country differences that may determine the post-acquisition behaviour of the firm but which are not 
associated with  international  technology  transfer.  The  most  obvious  example  would  be the  possible 
transfer  pricing  by  MNEs  in  order  to  move  profits  to  low-tax  jurisdictions,  a  factor  that  may  be 
particularly  relevant  given  the  difficulty  of pricing flows  of  intangible  assets  between  countries
(Devereux and Griffith, 2002). To control for this possibility we follow Branstetter et al. (2006) and 
include in the regressions a measure of relative corporate taxes between Spain and the country of origin 
of  the acquiring MNE. We  construct  the ratio of  corporate income taxes  of  a given country to the
corporate income taxes of Spain. The data come from the “Tax database” from the OECD. If corporate 
taxes are higher in Spain than in the other country, MNEs might be expected to increase their innovation
expenditures in Spain, thereby reducing taxable profits in the high-tax country. As corporate taxes in 
Spain increase with respect to the other country, the value of the relative corporate taxes ratio decreases. 
Therefore, if transfer pricing were a relevant source of differences in behaviour between MNEs from 
different countries we would expect a negative relationship between our measure of relative corporate 16
taxes and innovative expenditures. Finally, we also include regional and year dummies to control for 
other relevant regional and year factors.
The  effect  of  foreign  acquisition  on  the  different  measures  of  innovation  expenditures  are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 shows the effect of acquisitions not distinguishing between the 
location of the headquarters of the acquiring MNEs. We use the results in this table largely to provide a 
comparison with evidence elsewhere in the literature. In Table 7 we separate acquisitions that occur from 
countries technologically leading countries (Germany, Japan and the US) and those from elsewhere. We 
test formally whether the effects of acquisition differ between JUG and non-JUG countries using a Wald 
test for the equality of the coefficients in the final row of the table. 
In Tables 6 and 7, the additional variables that are included in the regression have relatively little 
explanatory power and generally display few consistent patterns. Of the firm level controls we find 
significance  for  the  firm  size  dummies  when  employment  is  smaller  than  100 for  total  innovation 
expenditures (columns i and ii). The export variable is significant on a few occasions, having a positive
effect on external  R&D and  several  of the sub-categories for  this variable and a negative effect on 
internal R&D. We find no evidence of transfer pricing in our results however. On no occasion in Tables 
6 and 7 do we find a significant effect associated with the relative corporate tax variable. This finding 
also holds where we to include a measure of the relative R&D tax incentives offered by countries.
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In  Table  6 we  find  few  significant  changes  to  R&D  expenditures associated  with  foreign 
acquisition. That total innovation expenditures are left unchanged relative to the control group of non-
acquired firms means our evidence for Spain lies between the mix of positive and negative effects found 
elsewhere in the literature. We do however find some effect on the composition of expenditures. The 
evidence  in  the  table  shows  a significant  negative  effect  on  external  R&D  (column  ii)  in  the  year 
following acquisition, where this is explained by a fall in domestic external R&D (column iv) and that 
from private firms abroad (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  We also find initial evidence of international 
technology transfer in (column vi), where there is a significant contemporaneous increase in knowledge 
transfer from affiliates of the firm not located in Spain. Such evidence helps to explain why MNEs have 
been found  to  use more  intensively external sources of  knowledge in  the  cross-section  evidence of 
Veugelers and Cassiman (2004), Criscuolo et al. (2010), and Wagner (2006). Our evidence suggests a 
causal relationship from multinational status and knowledge transfer from abroad. The effect of this 
increase in expenditures would appear to be large, in the period of acquisition transfers of technology 
from elsewhere in the business group rise by 0.411 log points. This equates to a rise of 50% on pre-
acquisition levels, although as the summary statistics in Table 1 indicate this is from a relatively low 
level.
                                                
26 This measure of tax incentives for R&D is based on OECD’s “B-indexes” following calculations by Warda 
(2001).  These results are available from the authors on request.17
Table 7 extends the results in Table 6 to allow for differences in the country of origin of the 
acquiring firm. Overall the results suggest that the effects of acquisition in Table 6 masked significant 
variation in innovation expenditures according to whether the MNE was from a technologically intensive 
country or not. From this table we conclude that the changes to the knowledge production function are 
more dramatic when FDI is from a more technologically advanced country. When FDI is from a non-
JUG country, according to our results, there are no significant changes to the composition of R&D 
expenditure compared to the control group of non-acquired firms. When acquisition is from one of these 
countries, the MNE determines which domestic firms to acquire based on the knowledge inputs of the 
target, but does not re-organise these inputs or transfer R&D between affiliates compared to the pre-
acquisition period. The evidence for this group of MNEs would appear to suggest that the R&D created 
knowledge of the target firm is an important motive for acquisition-FDI, but that the complementary 
knowledge asset of the acquirer is not R&D related. This might be because the target firm has product 
innovations that might be complemented by the brand or some other tangible or intangible asset of the
acquiring MNE. Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from exploring that possibility further.
For FDI from technologically intensive countries there is, in contrast, evidence of a significant 
fall in expenditures on internal R&D in the first two years following acquisition and a contemporaneous 
increase in expenditures on R&D effort outside of the firm. We observe a general shift from insourcing 
to outsourcing such that there is little impact on total R&D spending by the firm relative to the control 
group.
27 Moreover these changes are, at least in percentage terms, large. According to our estimates 
expenditures on internal R&D fall by 30% in each of the two periods following acquisition, whereas the 
value of R&D flows from elsewhere there is a one-off contemporaneous rise by 134% compared to their 
pre-acquisition levels.
The  changes  in  the  input-mix  in  the  knowledge  production  function for  MNEs  from 
technologically intensive countries contrast with the evidence on the pre-acquisition characteristics of 
acquired firms in Table 3. There we found that the probability of acquisition was increasing in internal 
R&D expenditure and decreasing in expenditures on R&D efforts outside of the firm. This might occur 
because the MNE does not value all aspects of the internal R&D generated within its new affiliate, or 
because there is replication of R&D efforts already conducted with the business group. In support of this 
view Cassiman et al. (2005) report case study evidence that R&D expenditures decline when acquisition 
is by a firm in the same technological field (and rise when in complementary fields). Whichever effect 
dominates it would seem that the knowledge assets sought by the acquirer does not extend to all of the 
R&D conducted in the acquired firm prior to acquisition.
Disaggregating expenditures on outsourced R&D effort we find that the increase in external 
R&D expenditure is explained by an increase in knowledge transfers within the business group (column 
                                                
27 The  net zero effect  in  the  period  contemporaneous  with  acquisition  occurs  despite  the  increase  in  external 
expenditure because of a decline in non-R&D innovation expenditure (see Table A4 in the Appendix).18
vi). The effects on this category of expenditure are strong, rising by 0.660 log points in the year of 
acquisition and 0.582 log points in the year after that. These imply that the value of R&D flows from 
elsewhere in the business group rise by 93% and then 80% compared to their pre-acquisition levels. That 
we do not observe equivalent increases when FDI is from countries that are less technologically intensive 
confirms  the  empirical  evidence  in  Branstetter  et  al.  (2006)  and  points to  a  conclusion  of 
complementarities between the technology in the non-frontier country and the MNEs own knowledge for 
this group.
28
In the final rows on the table we examine whether the differences between acquisitions by JUG 
and non-JUG countries are statistically significant or not, which we test using a Wald test for the equality 
of the coefficients. The results indicate that in most cases the answer is no, they are not statistically 
different from each other. The exceptions to this are in column (vi) where we reject the hypothesis that 
technology transfers by JUG acquisitions are similar to those from non-JUG countries.
5.2. Alternative Definitions of Technological Frontier Countries
Within our analysis we consider Japan, USA and Germany (JUG) as countries that lie at the 
technological frontier.
29 While the empirical results we present in Table 7 suggest that this assumption is 
a reasonable partitioning of the acquisitions that take place in the data, in Table 8 we test the sensitivity 
of our results by choosing an increasingly larger set of countries that are described as on, or close to, the 
technological frontier. We consider three additional sets of classifications, which we describe in Table 2 
columns (v) to (vii). The first alternative classification of country’s technological intensity is based on
the 10 countries with the highest ratio of Business Enterprise R&D expenditures (BERD) over GDP for 
the period 2004-2009. A second set of classifications is based on information generated by the European 
Commission  and  classifies  technological  leading  countries  according  the  European  Innovation 
Scoreboard (EIS) 2009.
30 Finally, we choose the separate the 5 least technologically intensive countries 
for which we have acquisitions (Brazil, India, Mexico, Poland and Portugal) into a separate group. 
Under the first three measures the greatest sensitivity surrounds the classification of Austria, 
Hong Kong and the UK. Of these the most relevant empirically is the UK; there are 7 acquisitions by UK 
MNEs in our sample compared to just one for Austria and Hong Kong. The UK is classified as a frontier 
country by the European Commission but is not amongst the 10 most R&D intensive countries according 
                                                
28 This result strongly suggesting that MNEs transfer internal knowledge to newly acquired subsidiaries would 
appear to confirm the case study evidence presented in Bresman et al. (1999).
29 Estimating the  changes in  R&D  expenditures  separately for  acquisitions  from  Germany,  Japan  and  the  US 
separately suggests that the technology transfers within the firm in column (viii) are largely explained by the FDI 
from Germany and the US. We find weaker evidence of the same effect for Japan, although it should be noted that 
there are only 3 acquisitions from this country.
30 Following  this  source,  technologically  leading  countries  include  Germany,  Denmark,  Switzerland,  Finland, 
Sweden and UK. We also add into this group the non-European countries: USA, Japan and Israel.19
to the OECD’s BERD measure.  In contrast, Austria and Hong Kong are amongst the 10 most R&D 
intensive  countries  according  to  OECD  data,  but  are  not  classified  as  technological  leaders  by  the 
European Commission. 
The regressions separating the top 10 countries as a single group are in Panel A of Table 8; 
results based on the European Commission classification are in Panel B and the results separating the 5 
least technologically intensive countries into a separate group are in Panel C. Comparing the results 
across the panels with those in Table 7, we note that qualitatively they do not change until we get to 
panel C. We continue to find across panels A and B evidence of a decrease in internal R&D expenditure 
and, an increase in technology imported from other affiliates within the same business group, when the 
acquisition is by a technologically intensive country and no changes for firms acquired by MNEs from 
other countries. Quantitatively the effect of these two changes are smaller in panels A and B compared to 
Table 7 however. The contemporaneous increase in technology transfers in column (vi) are 0.66 log 
points in Table 7 and 0.58 and 0.52 log points in panels A and B of Table 8. These equate to a rise of 
93%,  78%  or  68%  in  expenditures  on  this  category.  Applying  a  Wald  test  for  the  equality  of  the 
coefficients we find that the differences between technologically advanced and non-advanced MNEs are
now no longer statistically significant.
31 As might be expected, extending the definition of MNEs that are 
classified as being from countries that are more technologically intensive than Spain, the evidence of an 
effect from the internationalisation of R&D on the knowledge production function weakens.
In Panel C, where we use the broadest definition of FDI from technologically intensive countries
and by definition the narrowest definition of what is not, we find little evidence of post-acquisition to the 
knowledge production when FDI is from technologically intensive countries. However, unexpectedly we 
do find that there are significant changes to the choice of knowledge inputs for acquisitions from the 5 
least technologically intensive countries compared to the control group.  For this group, and it should be 
remembered  that  these  effects  are  identified  from  just  6  acquisitions,  the  results  indicate  that 
expenditures on internal R&D rise significantly and that on external R&D fall, where this is explained by 
the decline in domestically outsourced R&D effort. This is opposite to the results found in panels A and 
B.  In  column  (ii)  the  estimated  effect  on internal  R&D  is  1.198  log  points  in  the  year  following 
acquisition (a rise of 233%), while external R&D expenditures fall by an estimated 99% and 85% in the 
two years following acquisition. The net effect of this is for total R&D expenditures to rise, by on 
average 290% in year 1 and 108% in year 2, where again this contrasts with what was found from FDI 
from other countries.
Motivated by these results in Table 9 we separate acquisitions into one of three groups which we 
label  as  those  from  technologically intensive  countries  (Germany,  Japan  and  the  US),  the  5  least 
technologically  intensive  countries  (Brazil,  India,  Mexico,  Poland,  Portugal)  and  a  final  group  of 
                                                
31 We do not report the Wald test within the table in order to conserve space.20
countries which we now label as having a similar technologically intensity to Spain. The results in this 
table would  appear to  confirm  different effects across these  three  groups.  When  FDI is  from more 
technologically advanced countries we find there is a rebalancing of the knowledge production function 
away from internal R&D and towards a greater reliance on that from elsewhere within the MNE. For 
countries  with  a  similar  technological  intensity  as  Spain  we  find  no  evidence  of  a  change  in  the 
knowledge production function relative to the counterfactual. Finally, when acquisition occurs from a 
less technologically intensive country we find that there is again a significant change in the knowledge 
production function, but this time towards internal R&D and away from that on outsourced R&D in 
Spain. Only for this group is there evidence of an increase in total innovation expenditures following 
acquisition. This  pattern  of  changes  would  appear  consistent  with  an  interpretation  of  technology 
sourcing by MNEs from less technologically intensive countries. For MNEs from technologically similar 
countries we find no clear evidence that the knowledge assets of both parties are a motive for the FDI 
that took place.
Finally and for completeness, in Table 10 we re-examine the types of firms that are acquired by 
MNEs from countries separated according to their technological intensity. In column (i) we compare the 
affiliates acquired by MNEs from the JUG countries and those countries with a technology level similar 
to Spain, in column (ii) we compare the JUG acquisitions with those by the 5 least technologically 
intensive, and in column (iii) those from the technologically similar and 5 least technologically intensive. 
Few of the coefficients are significant within the table, suggesting that the previous finding that the types 
of Spanish firms acquired by foreign MNEs are statistically similar to each other continue to hold. Of the 
two  significance  coefficients  within  Table  10 both  relate  to  the  comparison  with  the  5  least 
technologically intensive countries. In column (ii) we find evidence that those firms acquired by JUG 
countries have significantly lower external R&D expenditures compared to acquisitions from the least 
technologically intensive, while in column (iii) there is evidence that firms acquired by MNEs from 
countries with a similar technology level to Spain have significantly higher internal R&D. 
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This paper exploits a unique dataset that provides detailed information on all components of 
innovation expenditures of Spanish firms, distinguishing knowledge inputs by provider and between 
national and international origins, in an annual panel setting. This allows us to study changes in the R&D 
structure of acquired firms following acquisition by foreign MNEs. In particular, we can observe the 
evolution of R&D imports coming from the business group after acquisition, which is our measure of 
international technology transfers.  From this we infer whether complementarity of knowledge assets 
were a likely motive behind acquisition. 
Our results suggest that foreign acquisitions are in part dependent upon the knowledge inputs 
used by a firm, which we interpret as evidence consistent with the view that the knowledge assets of the 21
target firm may be a motive for acquisition FDI. We find that firms that spend more on internal R&D and 
less on external R&D are more likely to be acquired as are firms that already share knowledge between 
their R&D affiliates abroad. While this latter effect is consistent with the knowledge complementarities 
view, we note that this variable may capture other aspects of the firm. Given the country in which the 
acquisitions take place is not on the technological frontier we also examine differences between MNEs. 
While we find some suggestive evidence that MNEs from countries that are as, or less technologically 
intensive than Spain are more responsive the knowledge inputs used by the target firm, we find that any 
differences compared to the most technologically intensive countries (Germany, Japan and the US) are 
not statistically significant.
Between MNE differences appear to be instead more important to the post-acquisition changes in 
knowledge  inputs.  Relative  to  the  control  group  of  non-acquired  firms  we  find  that  MNEs  can  be 
separated into three groups. When the acquisition FDI is from a more technologically intensive country 
there is a shift in the knowledge production function away from expenditures on internal-domestic R&D 
effort and towards R&D from elsewhere in the business group. We interpret this as direct evidence of 
technology  transfer  and  argue  that  it  may  help  to  explain  the  post-acquisition  improvement  in 
productivity found in many studies. This also suggests that complementary knowledge assets were a 
motive for acquisition.
For acquisitions FDI from countries which are more technologically similar to the host country 
there are no significant changes to the knowledge production function compared to the control group. For 
these MNEs there is evidence of selection based on knowledge inputs but no post-acquisition changes. 
This result is interesting given MNEs from these countries represent  the bulk  of  the FDI flows we 
observe in the data. Finally, for FDI from less technologically intensive countries there would appear to 
be a shift in the knowledge production function towards domestic-internal R&D, while external R&D 
falls by 100%. For MNEs that are from countries away from the technological frontier it is less clear that 
the knowledge assets held by the foreign MNE is a motive for FDI. This might instead be viewed as 
evidence of technology sourcing FDI, although that the firm does not attempt to ‘tap-into’ the R&D 
being undertaken in the rest of Spain suggests that the technology sourcing motive we observe in Spain is 
different from that for the US reported in Griffith et al. (2006).
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  Table 1: Summary Statistics of Innovation Expenditures by Type of Firm
All acquired firms Acquired firms from
JUG countries
Acquired firms from
non-JUG countries Never acquired
Year t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1
Total Innovation Expenditure (log) 13.44 13.35 13.23 13.13 13.22 13.07 13.61 13.43 13.31 12.45
(1.56) (1.59) (1.47) (1.62) (1.68) (1.67) (1.50) (1.54) (1.36) (1.56)
% of total innovation expenditure on...
Internal R&D 73.78 68.60 71.36 77.74 68.40 63.40 71.61 68.71 75.47 73.45
(32.72) (34.77) (36.15) (31.97) (36.42) (40.02) (33.06) (33.98) (33.47) (31.02)
External R&D 12.89 14.62 14.38 10.06 13.49 12.82 14.45 15.23 15.19 11.43
(23.61) (25.37) (28.46) (22.89) (25.79) (28.40) (23.95) (25.22) (28.61) (20.83)
Non-R&D innovation 14.50 16.78 14.26 13.94 18.10 23.78 14.80 16.05 9.34 15.98
(25.84) (28.50) (27.91) (26.79) (29.65) (35.86) (25.44) (27.94) (21.38) (26.85)
Total External R&D  Expenditure (log) 5.36 5.71 4.93 4.28 5.48 4.66 5.96 5.84 5.08 4.89
(6.12) (6.13) (6.02) (5.89) (6.11) (5.93) (6.18) (6.16) (6.09) (5.62)
% of external R&D on...
External domestic  71.77 69.87 75.30 59.39 57.83 60.18 76.73 76.19 82.66 93.81
(40.41) (42.14) (40.11) (45.32) (46.70) (47.12) (37.53) (38.45) (34.52) (20.00)
External foreign  28.23 30.13 24.70 40.61 42.17 39.82 23.27 23.81 17.33 6.19
(40.41) (42.14) (40.11) (45.32) (46.70) (47.12) (37.53) (38.45) (34.52) (20.00)
Total External Foreign Expenditure (log) 2.21 2.34 1.68 2.20 2.76 2.17 2.23 2.12 1.42 0.69
(4.82) (4.85) (4.20) (4.79) (5.26) (4.64) (4.85) (4.62) (3.96) (2.69)
% of external foreign R&D on...
External foreign same business group 58.62 69.59 72.27 54.17 76.84 80.01 61.05 64.64 65.94 5.41
(48.39) (44.87) (43.88) (49.81) (40.43) (39.99) (48.61) (47.94) (47.76) (21.38)
External foreign other private firms 35.50 27.71 12.73 29.17 16.49 8.88 38.95 35.36 15.87 74.19
(46.92) (43.55) (31.39) (45.02) (34.70) (26.65) (48.61) (47.94) (35.77) (41.90)
External foreign non-private firms 5.88 2.70 15.00 16.67 6.67 11.11 0.00 0.00 18.18 20.41
(23.88) (16.44) (36.63) (38.92) (25.82) (33.33) (0.00) (0.00) (40.45) (38.65)
Number of firms 189 189 144 67 67 48 122 122 96 4,106
Note: The symbol t-1 denotes one year before acquisition by a foreign MNE; t denotes the year of the acquisition; and t+1 means one year after acquisition. JUG countries are 
Japan, USA and Germany. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  27























Israel 2 2 3.54 √ √
Sweden 3 3 2.62 √ √
Japan 3 3 2.58 √ √ √
Finland 2 1 2.52 √ √
Switzerland 8 8 2.17 √ √
USA 33 26 1.87 √ √ √
Denmark 2 2 1.80 √ √
Germany 31 26 1.79 √ √ √
Austria 1 1 1.76 √
Hong-Kong 1 1 1.58 √
Luxembourg 8 5 1.33
France 25 21 1.32
Belgium 8 8 1.29
Canada 4 4 1.08
United Kingdom 12 7 1.08 √
Netherlands 16 12 0.96
Slovenia 1 1 0.97
Czech Republic 1 0 0.90
Norway 3 2 0.85
Spain 0.66
Italy 17 15 0.58
Portugal 3 3 0.52 √
Brazil 1 1 0.49
(a) √
Mexico 1 1 0.18 √
Poland 2 1 0.17 √
India 1 0 n/a √
Total 189 154
Notes: Period 2004-2009. (a) Data of Brazil are for the year 2006. BERD as % of GDP data come from OECD database. Columns (iv) to (vii) refer to different classifications of 
technologically  leading  countries  and  technologically  non-leading  countries.  Source  for  column  (vi)  European  Innovation Scoreboard  (2009).28


























Log(Total innovation expenditure) 0.0011*** 0.0006
(0.000) (0.000)
Log(Total innovation /turnover) -0.0046 -0.0035
(0.005) (0.005)
External R&D/internal R&D -0.0000
(0.000)
Log(internal R&D) 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0003 0.0008*** 0.0005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Log(external R&D) -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
External R&D same business group/external R&D 0.0000 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
External R&D same business group dummy 0.0368** 0.0465** 0.0672*** 0.0206* 0.0552*** -0.0428
(0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.033)
Labour productivity 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.0136
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014)
Size <50 employees -0.0078*** -0.0077*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0020** -0.0052*** 0.0395
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.053)
Size: 50-99 employees -0.0026** -0.0025** -0.0024** -0.0023** 0.0001 -0.0022*** 0.0610
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.055)
Size: 200-499 employees 0.0006 0.0005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0016 -0.0004 0.0861
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.055)
Size: >=500 employees 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.047)
Export dummy 0.0018* 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0295
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.041)
Observations 17,581 16,394 16,394 16,394 16,068 16,216 504
Note: In columns (i) to (vi), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is acquired in year t, and zero otherwise. In column (vii), the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is acquired by a MNE from either Germany, Japan or the US (JUG) in year t, and zero if the 
acquisition is by a MNE from a non-JUG country. All estimations use a probit model. The coefficients refer to marginal effects calculated at sample means. Estimated standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in parenthesis. All independent variables are lagged one period and are in logarithms except dummy variables. All regressions 
include region and year dummies. * Significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.29


























Log(Number of patents) -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Log(Total innovation expenditure) 0.0015*** 0.0008
(0.000) (0.001)
Log(Total innovation /turnover) -0.0061 -0.0036
(0.006) (0.005)
External R&D/internal R&D -0.0000
(0.000)
Log(internal R&D) 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0003 0.0009*** -0.0060
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Log(external R&D) -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
External same business group/external R&D 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
External same business group dummy 0.0387** 0.0479** 0.0731*** 0.0234* 0.0574*** -0.0618
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.039)
Labour productivity 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0014*** 0.0017*** 0.0152
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
Size <50 employees -0.0067*** -0.0077*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** -0.0017 -0.0054*** 0.0924
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.075)
Size: 50-99 employees -0.0029** -0.0033*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0001 -0.0026*** 0.0811
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.071)
Size: 200-499 employees -0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0008 0.0014 -0.0013* 0.1128
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.072)
Size: >=500 employees -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0329
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.072)
Export dummy 0.0023* 0.0017 0.0016 0.0016 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0261
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.050)
Observations 14,523 13,527 13,527 13,527 13,295 13,397 362
Note: In columns (i) to (vi), the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is acquired in year t, and zero otherwise. In column (vii), the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is acquired by a MNE from either Germany, Japan or the US (JUG) in year t, and zero if the 
acquisition is by a MNE from a non-JUG country. All estimations use a probit model. The coefficients refer to marginal effects calculated at sample means. Estimated standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and shown in parenthesis. All independent variables are lagged one period and are in logarithms except dummy variables. All regressions 
include region and year dummies. * Significant at 10%. ** significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.30
Table 5: Balancing tests
a) For each ex ante covariate
b) Overall measures of covariate balancing
Mean abs. 
std. bias















matching 39.53 37.68 0.145 279.08 0.000
After 
matching 8.88 77.53% 8.74 76.80% 0.020 8.49 0.486
Notes: *Likelihood-ratio test of the joint insignificance of all regressors.
Variable Mean %bias % |Bias| t-test
Treated Control Reduction t p-value
Log(internal R&D) 11.91 12.52 -17.0 13.4 -1.50 0.134
Log(external R&D) 4.81 4.93 -2.1 75.4 -0.18 0.859
External same business 
group dummy 0.08 0.05 14.6 74.8 1.39 0.166
Labour productivity 12.32 12.29 3.7 94.7 0.36 0.722
Size <50 employees 0.19 0.19 0.0 100 0.00 1.000
Size 50-99 employees 0.18 0.21 -8.7 -463.7 -0.72 0.471
Size 200-499 employees 0.22 0.21 1.7 95.4 0.14 0.891
Size >500 employees 0.18 0.12 17.6 55.3 1.43 0.155
Export dummy 0.79 0.86 -14.5 60.5 -1.50 0.13531






















Year of acquisition 0.043 -0.178 0.351 0.222 0.315 0.411***
    (0.063) (0.145) (0.383) (0.412) (0.241) (0.145)
One year after  -0.016 -0.133 -0.460* -0.607* -0.029 0.136
   acquisition (0.061) (0.169) (0.241) (0.295) (0.356) (0.269)
Relative corporate tax -0.033 -0.482 0.777 0.551 0.026 0.431
(0.180) (0.772) (0.823) (0.923) (1.345) (1.115)
Size <50 employees -0.526*** -0.761*** -0.127 0.783 -0.803 -0.600
(0.151) (0.130) (1.618) (1.475) (0.698) (0.429)
Size: 50-99 employees -0.507*** -0.630*** 0.279 1.111 -0.079 -0.311
(0.117) (0.115) (1.168) (0.842) (0.382) (0.330)
Size: 200-499 employees -0.035 -0.124 0.599 0.183 0.464 -0.016
(0.199) (0.114) (0.554) (0.635) (0.448) (0.384)
Size: >=500 employees 0.030 0.127 0.291 -0.436 0.860* 0.565
(0.174) (0.311) (0.509) (0.896) (0.461) (0.519)
Export dummy -0.066 -0.248* 0.514** 0.368* 0.347* 0.447***
(0.093) (0.121) (0.232) (0.211) (0.183) (0.125)
Observations 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.089 0.415 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.024
Number of firms 295 295 295 295 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions  include firm-fixed effects, sector,  region, and  year  dummies.  Variables  are all in  logs (except  dummy 
variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 32
Table 7: The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Innovation Expenditures: Differences between 























Year of acquisition 0.018 -0.355*** 0.851*** 0.525*** 0.561 0.660***
    (0.049) (0.018) (0.083) (0.134) (0.343) (0.144)
One year after  -0.144*** -0.392*** -0.505 -1.136*** 0.260 0.582***
   acquisition (0.044) (0.100) (0.450) (0.272) (0.623) (0.139)
Non-JUG countries
Year of acquisition 0.059 -0.066 0.037 0.033 0.160 0.253
    (0.098) (0.233) (0.635) (0.681) (0.287) (0.162)
One year after  0.058 0.019 -0.446 -0.313 -0.201 -0.125
   acquisition (0.079) (0.244) (0.281) (0.289) (0.394) (0.325)
Relative corporate tax -0.033 -0.495 0.828 0.591 0.045 0.449
(0.197) (0.713) (0.862) (0.947) (1.364) (1.126)
Size <50 employees -0.533*** -0.770*** -0.147 0.741 -0.793 -0.582
(0.151) (0.127) (1.630) (1.500) (0.693) (0.416)
Size: 50-99 employees -0.510*** -0.634*** 0.268 1.091 -0.075 -0.303
(0.116) (0.114) (1.177) (0.856) (0.382) (0.334)
Size: 200-499 employees -0.038 -0.130 0.604 0.179 0.472 -0.007
(0.200) (0.113) (0.555) (0.634) (0.450) (0.379)
Size: >=500 employees 0.033 0.143 0.259 -0.448 0.839* 0.541
(0.178) (0.320) (0.496) (0.893) (0.455) (0.525)
Export dummy -0.065 -0.247* 0.517** 0.373* 0.347* 0.446***
(0.092) (0.120) (0.240) (0.215) (0.179) (0.117)
Wald test of equality of coefficients (p-value): JUG vs. non-JUG
Acquisition year 0.711 0.225 0.225 0.487 0.367 0.066
Year after acquisition 0.029 0.117 0.913 0.040 0.541 0.054
Observations 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.090 0.416 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.027
Number of firms 295 295 295 295 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions  include firm-fixed effects, sector,  region, and  year  dummies.  Variables  are all in  logs (except  dummy 
variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 33
Table  8:  The  Effect  of  Foreign  Acquisition  on  Innovation  Expenditures:  Alternative 






















Panel A: Top 10 and non-top 10 in terms of BERD as percentage of GDP
b)
Top 10
Year of acquisition -0.002 -0.404*** 0.634** 0.348 0.397 0.583***
    (0.048) (0.084) (0.233) (0.207) (0.323) (0.148)
One year after  -0.151*** -0.464*** -0.648 -1.145*** 0.118 0.477***
   acquisition (0.042) (0.144) (0.430) (0.328) (0.512) (0.148)
Not Top 10
Year of acquisition 0.083 0.021 0.106 0.117 0.243 0.259
    (0.113) (0.240) (0.715) (0.769) (0.325) (0.183)
One year after  0.098 0.150 -0.312 -0.163 -0.154 -0.154
   acquisition (0.090) (0.250) (0.244) (0.256) (0.469) (0.373)
Panel B: Technological leaders and non-leaders (Source European Commission)
c)
Technological Leader
Year of acquisition -0.003 -0.353*** 0.574** 0.333* 0.350 0.519***
    (0.045) (0.086) (0.227) (0.192) (0.304) (0.165)
One year after  -0.093 -0.365** -0.677* -1.106*** 0.096 0.417**
   acquisition (0.061) (0.149) (0.381) (0.339) (0.468) (0.163)
Not Techno. Leader
Year of acquisition 0.091 0.008 0.118 0.109 0.278 0.295
    (0.124) (0.261) (0.779) (0.842) (0.357) (0.196)
One year after  0.061 0.101 -0.257 -0.125 -0.153 -0.143
   acquisition (0.092) (0.267) (0.284) (0.293) (0.503) (0.405)
Panel C: 5 least technologically intensive countries
More Techno. Intensive
Year of acquisition -0.012 -0.246 0.537 0.409 0.360 0.418**
    (0.054) (0.143) (0.362) (0.398) (0.243) (0.148)
One year after  -0.059 -0.211 -0.384 -0.529 -0.114 0.135
   acquisition (0.053) (0.179) (0.253) (0.312) (0.370) (0.286)
Least Techno Intensive
Year of acquisition 1.360*** 1.413 -4.208** -4.357** -0.957 0.238
    (0.160) (1.591) (1.701) (1.846) (0.733) (0.364)
One year after  0.733** 1.198*** -1.874*** -2.062*** 1.317** 0.148
   acquisition (0.321) (0.343) (0.646) (0.666) (0.522) (0.128)
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions include firm-fixed effects, sector, region, and year dummies. For classification of countries a), b) and c) see 
Table 2. Variables are all in logs (except dummy variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 34
Table 9:  The Effect of Foreign  Acquisition on Innovation Expenditures: Separating JUG, 























Year of acquisition 0.019 -0.354*** 0.846*** 0.520*** 0.559 0.660***
    (0.054) (0.020) (0.097) (0.117) (0.344) (0.144)
One year after  -0.144*** -0.393*** -0.509 -1.139*** 0.254 0.581***
Year of acquisition (0.041) (0.103) (0.460) (0.266) (0.623) (0.138)
Technologically Similar
Year of acquisition -0.032 -0.173 0.331 0.339 0.226 0.253
    (0.077) (0.233) (0.614) (0.669) (0.296) (0.171)
One year after  -0.006 -0.094 -0.313 -0.149 -0.349 -0.152
Year of acquisition (0.072) (0.267) (0.277) (0.273) (0.397) (0.355)
Least Techno. intensive
Year of acquisition 1.359*** 1.414 -4.215** -4.362** -0.958 0.236
    (0.160) (1.593) (1.709) (1.854) (0.732) (0.361)
One year after  0.733** 1.198*** -1.871*** -2.058*** 1.317** 0.148
Year of acquisition (0.321) (0.343) (0.647) (0.664) (0.521) (0.125)
Observations 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.104 0.419 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.027
Number of firms 295 295 295 295 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions include firm-fixed effects, sector, region, and year dummies. For classification of countries a), b), c) and d) 
see Table 2. Variables are all in logs (except dummy variables). Remaining controls are the same as in Table 6. * 
Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 35










vs. 5 Least 
Techno Intensive
(iii)
Log(internal R&D) -0.0016 0.0440 0.0414*
(0.010) (0.029) (0.023)
Log(external R&D) -0.0028 -0.0124* -0.0025
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
External same business group dummy -0.0458 -0.1241 0.0471
(0.034) (0.117) (0.103)
Labour productivity 0.0148 -0.0067 0.0372
(0.015) (0.044) (0.028)
Size <50 employees 0.0307 0.1573 0.0469
(0.054) (0.151) (0.091)
Size: 50-99 employees 0.0628 0.1083 0.0225
(0.057) (0.136) (0.098)
Size: 200-499 employees 0.0787 0.2004 0.0697
(0.056) (0.141) (0.083)
Size: >=500 employees -0.0051 -0.0899 -0.0488
(0.049) (0.130) (0.092)
Export dummy -0.0367 -0.0565 -0.0503
(0.044) (0.106) (0.083)
Observations 480 202 326
Note: In columns (i) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm is acquired by a 
MNE from either Germany, Japan or the US (JUG) in year t, and zero if acquired from a Technologically Similar 
Country. In columns (ii) the dependent variable equals one if the firm is acquired by a MNE from either Germany, 
Japan or the US (JUG) in year t, and zero if acquired from one of the 5 Least Technologically Intensive Countries. In 
columns (iii) the dependent variable equals one if the firm is acquired by a MNE from A Technologically Similar 
Country in year t, and zero if acquired from one of the 5 Least Technologically Intensive Countries. All estimations use 
a probit model. The coefficients refer to marginal effects calculated at sample means. Estimated standard errors are 
clustered  at the  firm  level and  shown  in  parenthesis.  All independent  variables  are  lagged  one  period  and  are  in 
logarithms  except  dummy  variables.  All  regressions  include region and  year  dummies.  *  Significant  at  10%.  ** 
significant at 5%. *** significant at 1%.36
APPENDIX A: Additional tables
Table A1: Classification of total innovation expenditures
Subcategories of 
Total innovation expenditures  [1-3] Definition
R&D internal [1] In-house or intramural R&D: Creative work undertaken within 
an  enterprise  on  an  occasional  or  regular  basis  in  order  to 
increase the stock of knowledge and its use to devise new and 
improved goods, services and processes.
R&D external [2] Acquisition of R&D or extramural R&D: Firm purchases  of 
creative  work  on  an  occasional  or  regular  basis  in  order  to 
increase the stock of knowledge and its use to devise new and 
improved goods, services and processes form other companies 
(including  other enterprises  within  the group)  or  public  and 
private research organizations
R&D external-domestic [2.1] Acquisition of R&D in Spain.
R&D external-foreign [2.2] Acquisition of R&D abroad.
R&D external-foreign same business group [2.2.1] R&D acquisitions abroad from companies that belong to the 
same business group
R&D external-foreign other private [2.2.2] R&D acquisitions abroad from companies that are legally 
independent and do not belong to the same business group
R&D external-foreign non-private [2.2.3] R&D acquisitions abroad from public administrations, 
universities, non-profi organizations and other international 
organizations
Innovation expenditures other than R&D [3] Acquisition  of  machinery,  equipment  and  software: 
Acquisition of advanced machinery, equipment and computer 
hardware or software to produce new or significantly improved 
goods, services, production processes, or delivery methods. 
Acquisition  of  external  knowledge:  Purchase  or  licensing  of 
patents  and  non-patented  inventions,  know-how,  and  other 
types of knowledge from other enterprises or organizations. 
Expenditures  on  design  functions  for  the  development  or 
implementation  of  new  or  improved  goods,  services  and 
processes. Expenditure on design in the R&D phase of product 
development should be excluded. 
Internal or external training for personnel specifically for the 
development and/or introduction of innovations. 
Expenditures on all activities concerning market preparation
and introduction of new or significantly improved goods and 
services, including market research and launch advertising. 
Note: The numbers correspond to the classification of innovation expenditures, which we use in tables 3 and 6 to 9. 
Data are in Euros. We take the logarithms of these variables to construct the variables that we use in the empirical 
analysis (Source PITEC database).37
Table A2: Summary Statistics of Innovation Expenditures by Type of Firm
All acquired firms Acquired firms from
JUG countries
Acquired firms from
non-JUG countries Never acquired
Year t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1 t-1 t t+1
Non-R&D Expenditures (log) 6.09 6.06 5.40 5.67 5.95 6.90 6.32 6.12 4.63 5.84
(6.10) (6.05) (5.95) (6.12) (6.14) (6.02) (6.10) (6.02) (5.80) (5.58)
External foreign same business group (log) 1.47 1.82 1.36 1.31 2.36 1.93 1.56 1.52 1.07 0.05
(4.13) (4.44) (3.87) (3.91) (4.93) (4.42) (4.26) (4.13) (3.55) (0.84)
External foreign other private firms (log) 0.79 0.70 0.25 0.75 0.63 0.25 0.82 0.74 0.25 0.53
(2.97) (2.81) (1.74) (3.02) (2.99) (1.76) (2.96) (2.71) (1.73) (2.38)
External foreign non-private firms(log) 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.29 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.17
(1.02) (0.72) (1.44) (1.71) (1.21) (1.45) (0.00) (0.00) (1.44) (1.37)
Number of firms 189 189 144 67 67 48 122 122 96 4,106
Note: The symbol t-1 denotes one year before acquisition by a foreign MNE; t denotes the year of the acquisition; and t+1 means one year after acquisition. JUG countries are 
Japan, USA and Germany. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  38















Year of acquisition -0.135 0.222 0.315
    (0.343) (0.412) (0.241)
One year after  -0.802 -0.607* -0.029
   acquisition (0.721) (0.295) (0.356)
Relative corporate tax -0.029 0.551 0.026
(1.817) (0.923) (1.345)
Size <50 employees -0.947 0.783 -0.803
(0.965) (1.475) (0.698)
Size: 50-99 employees -1.793** 1.111 -0.079
(0.723) (0.842) (0.382)
Size: 200-499 employees 0.074 0.183 0.464
(0.777) (0.635) (0.448)
Size: >=500 employees 0.079 -0.436 0.860*
(0.941) (0.896) (0.461)
Export dummy 0.416 0.368* 0.347*
(0.655) (0.211) (0.183)
Observations 1,288 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.061 0.013 0.017
Number of firms 288 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions  include firm-fixed effects, sector,  region, and  year  dummies.  Variables  are all in  logs (except  dummy 
variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 39
Table A4: The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Innovation Expenditures: Differences between 
















Year of acquisition -0.833*** 0.020 0.025
    (0.113) (0.345) (0.050)
One year after  0.240 -0.464 0.097
   acquisition (0.451) (0.497) (0.140)
Non-JUG countries
Year of acquisition 0.304 -0.068 -0.004
    (0.493) (0.174) (0.054)
One year after  -1.389 -0.496 0.256
   acquisition (0.937) (0.318) (0.253)
Relative corporate tax -0.104 -1.090 0.308
(1.778) (0.739) (0.401)
Size <50 employees -0.826 -0.126 0.258***
(0.972) (0.345) (0.069)
Size: 50-99 employees -1.725** 0.317 0.245***
(0.703) (0.238) (0.073)
Size: 200-499 employees 0.095 0.083 0.184
(0.792) (0.201) (0.209)
Size: >=500 employees 0.126 -0.162 0.166
(0.952) (0.220) (0.217)
Export dummy 0.402 -0.068 0.054
(0.657) (0.123) (0.164)
Wald test of equality of coefficients (p-value): JUG vs. non-JUG
Acquisition year 0.031 0.823 0.682
Year after acquisition 0.120 0.957 0.585
Observations 1,288 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.064 0.023 0.035
Number of firms 288 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions  include firm-fixed effects, sector,  region, and  year  dummies.  Variables  are all in  logs (except  dummy 
variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 40
Table  A5:  The  Effect  of  Foreign  Acquisition  on  Innovation  Expenditures:  Alternative 



















Year of acquisition -0.566* -0.093 0.023
    (0.274) (0.306) (0.042)
One year after  -0.363 -0.469 0.067
   acquisition (0.693) (0.403) (0.115)
Not Top 10 0.241 0.017 -0.006
Year of acquisition (0.512) (0.192) (0.061)
    -1.157 -0.494 0.308
One year after  (1.038) (0.374) (0.296)
   acquisition -0.566* -0.093 0.023




Year of acquisition -0.572** -0.087 0.023
    (0.254) (0.277) (0.040)
One year after  0.132 -0.421 0.066
   acquisition (0.586) (0.372) (0.109)
Not Techno. Leader 0.323 0.022 -0.009
Year of acquisition (0.569) (0.210) (0.066)
    -1.711* -0.542 0.327
One year after  (0.975) (0.398) (0.319)
   acquisition -0.572** -0.087 0.023
Panel C: 5 least technologically intensive countries
More Techno. Intensive
Year of acquisition -0.332 0.011 0.000
    (0.293) (0.174) (0.039)
One year after  -1.041 -0.453 0.078
   acquisition (0.741) (0.287) (0.136)
Least Techno Intensive 4.736** -1.115* -0.008
Year of acquisition (1.741) (0.577) (0.101)
    4.247 -1.020* 2.175**
One year after  (2.907) (0.546) (0.959)
   acquisition -0.332 0.011 0.000
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions include firm-fixed effects, sector, region, and year dummies. For classification of countries a), b) and c) see 
Table 2. Variables are all in logs (except dummy variables). * Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. 41
Table A6: The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Innovation Expenditures: Separating JUG, 
















Year of acquisition -0.835*** 0.019 0.024
    (0.127) (0.350) (0.047)
One year after  0.235 -0.464 0.092
Year of acquisition (0.459) (0.500) (0.137)
Technologically Similar
Year of acquisition -0.001 0.006 -0.016
    (0.425) (0.167) (0.058)
One year after  -1.828* -0.446 0.069
Year of acquisition (0.913) (0.340) (0.203)
Least Techno. intensive
Year of acquisition 4.766** -1.115* -0.008
    (1.749) (0.577) (0.101)
One year after  4.225 -1.020* 2.176**
Year of acquisition (2.922) (0.546) (0.960)
Observations 1,288 1,490 1,490
R-squared 0.070 0.024 0.046
Number of firms 288 295 295
Note:  OLS  estimates.  Estimated  standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  country level  and  shown  in  parenthesis. All 
regressions include firm-fixed effects, sector, region, and year dummies. For classification of countries a), b), c) and d) 
see Table 2. Variables are all in logs (except dummy variables). Remaining controls are the same as in Table 6. * 
Significant at 10%;** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 